WASHINGTON: Ambassador Joe Wilson, the man at the heart of the White House/CIA leak controversy, recently sat down with TALONNEWS.COM for an exclusive interview to discuss his mission to Africa to investigate Iraq's desire to purchase uranium for weapons, the leak of his wife's position within the CIA, the foreign policy of President Bush and his administration, and a host of other issues.

Below is Part 2 of the exclusive TALONNEWS.COM interview with Ambassador Joe Wilson. Part 1 can be found by clicking here.

Background: In February 2002, former Ambassador Joe Wilson was sent to Niger by the CIA to investigate allegations that Iraq had tried to buy uranium. He says that he told the administration that the allegations were probably false. In the January 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush made reference to British intelligence that differed with Wilson's conclusion. The subsequent controversy over the "16 words" was the result of the former ambassador's July article in The New York Times that accused the White House of exaggerating the threat posed by Iraq. A week later, columnist Robert Novak published the name of Wilson's wife, identifying Valerie Plame as a CIA operative. Wilson accused the Bush administration of leaking his wife's name to Novak.

TN: If we subsequently find weapons of mass destruction will that change your mind as to the validity of Operation Iraqi Freedom?

Wilson: I have always said that I believe we will probably find chemical weapons, biological precursors, and we would find continuing interests in resuscitating the nuclear weapons program. I never discounted the potential threat to the region and that posed to us by weapons of mass destruction programs. I always thought it was a legitimate concern. I just thought there were other ways we could successfully disarm Saddam Hussein.

When the president gave his State of the Union address, and Powell gave his speech over at the United Nations, they said the following: Scientists have been moved into neighboring countries, told that if they allowed themselves to be interviewed, they would be subject to death. That effectively makes the scientists doing the R&D on this stuff dysfunctional at best. They said that those who had been involved according to our intelligence in WMD programs were busy cleaning up the sites and if they are cleaning up the sites, they are not busy building weapons of mass destruction. They said that we have inspectors roaming through the palaces of Saddam Hussein. If people are roaming through the palaces, then those people who are busy in those programs are moving things and not building weapons.

They also said that we have satellite photos -- flash to the photos -- and we are hearing everything they're saying -- flash to the tape recordings. Now most people who are in the disarmament business and non-proliferation business will tell you that disruption is a significant measure of success. So the question really becomes, if it was a significant measure of success to be disrupting these weapons of mass destruction programs, why then did we need to invade, conquer, and now occupy Iraq?

Additionally, it's not so much as what I had to say in the run-up to the war, but the fact is that when we went in, when we went up the Tigris and Euphrates River valleys, we completely bypassed the nuclear site Tuweta. In fact we didn't circle back and secure that site until after images were broadcast around the world that showed kids suffering from severe radiation sickness as a consequence of the looting that went on at these sites and their tainted drinking water or them swimming in barrels of water that contained uranium yellowcake.

We also, according to one Congressman, and I haven't verified this independently, did not secure the Iraqi version of the CDC where the biological precursors would have been held. According to an article that Scott Ritter wrote in the New York Times, we did not secure all of the archives the inspectors had been going though when they were there prior to 1998.

TN: So the implication is?

Wilson: The implication to me is that this was not in fact a war to secure weapons of mass destruction. And the fact that we have not found the WMDs [leads to two questions]: One, did he ever have it -- is it a bluff as some are saying -- or, two, did he in fact manage to transfer it as both George Tenet and others, myself included, feared? The time they would transfer to a non-state actor was in the last moment -- in the final throes of the regime. I called it a posthumous last laugh and that should be of some concern to us. We did, in fact, precipitate by our actions that transfer. And again it gets back what I said earlier. The question was never whether or not you had the credible threat of force or even use force. The question always was, whether you did it smartly, intelligently for the right reasons or did it dumbly, for the wrong reasons.

TN: Rep. Peter King of New York called for an investigation of your violation of CIA secrecy when you came forward with your role in the Niger investigation. Is it possible that you endangered undercover operatives in Niger with your public statements on the matter?

Wilson: No.

TN: Were you required to sign a...

Wilson: No. This was not a CIA mission. Mr. King would do well to inform himself. I specifically told the CIA that I don't do clandestine and that I would do a government activity. I briefed the State Department before I went out there, I secured the clearance of the ambassador before I went to Niger. I spoke with the ambassador here when I went there. I made it clear to my interlocutors that I was posing questions on behalf of my government. My particular look at this was not clandestine, it was a look at how the industry operates. How is Niger mined? Who owns those mines? There are two mines. Who controls the product from the time it's in the ground until it arrives at its destination?

Secondly, I looked at the bureaucratic structure. How does the bureaucracy work? Who would have to sign it. The Niger participation in the uranium mine was through a state-owned company. The company reported to a minister, the minister of energy and mines. That minister is part of the council of ministers. In order for a decision covering the sale of 500 tons of uranium from Niger to Iraq, in order for that to take place, there would need to be a number of signatures on these documents: the minister of mines, and the foreign minister, because it was a decision between two sovereign governments, and the prime minister, acting on behalf of the government. It might also have had to have the signature of the president.

TN: So this could not have been done any other way?

Wilson: Then it would have to be gazetted. It would have to be registered with their equivalent of the Federal Register. I also looked into the possibility that you could have an off-the-books transfer which is a legitimate question. It struck me as I looked at this that at the end of the day, you're looking at 500 tons, not a pocketful of blood diamonds, and the people who control the ore from the time it is in the ground to the time it arrives at its destination are the French uranium company.

TN: Well the French haven't exactly been...

Wilson: The fact that you don't like the French or that the French seem to have favored a different approach on this is far different from the French violating U.N. Security Council resolutions of which they are signatories, and clandestinely transferring 500 tons of uranium to a rogue country like Iraq is a real reach. Not withstanding that, it was very clear to everybody I spoke to in my talks to them that if you wanted to pursue this further, which was beyond my scope, beyond what I said when I left Washington, if you want to pursue this any further, go talk to Cogema. In fact, actual fact you could see from a number of open sources what the sort of shipping records are throughout this, its not an easy thing to do. It would not have been just the French, just because of the nature of the business. The production schedules are set every year. Every couple of months the consortium members meet to adjust production schedules based upon a sort of updated demand on the part of the customers.

The uranium in Niger is produced at a loss, it is more expensive to produce uranium from Niger than it is to buy it on the open market. So there is not a lot of incentive to overproduce, and in any event, the producers are required to: one, obviously abide by IAEA regulations, and two, just to get 500 tons of yellowcake into Iraq would require that you work through the U.N. Sanctions Committee. If you are a legitimate sovereign nation, and whatever you think of the French, they are a legitimate sovereign nation, they are a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Additionally, if they really wanted to get Saddam Hussein uranium, they can get him uranium more easily from their own nuclear industry rather than doing a deal from Niger.

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This interview is continued in Part 3.